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Securing the Institutional Balance in the Procedure for Concluding
InternationalAgreements: European Parliament v. Council (Pirate
Transfer Agreement with Mauritius)
Case C-658/11, European Parliament v. Council of the European Union
(Pirate Transfer Agreement with Mauritius), Judgment of the Court (Grand
Chamber) of 24 June 2014, EU:C:2014:2025
1. Introduction
The Treaty of Lisbon fundamentally revised the legal framework of the EU’s
external action.1 One of the most important innovations was certainly the
introduction of a single procedure for negotiating and concluding
international agreements in Article 218 TFEU. Nevertheless, the procedural
requirements differ depending upon the subject of the agreement. In
particular, agreements relating to the common foreign and security policy
(CFSP) require a special treatment, reflecting the specific position of the latter
in the EU legal order.2 For agreements relating exclusively or principally to the
CFSP, the High Representative – and not the Commission – has a right of
initiative and plays a key role in the negotiations.3 Article 218(6)TFEU further
provides that the European Parliament has no right of consent nor a right to be
consulted where agreements relate exclusively to the CFSP. Yet, Article
218(10) TFEU foresees that “the European Parliament shall be immediately
and fully informed at all stages of the procedure” without making any
reference to the subject of the agreement.
It was written in the stars that this new procedural code would lead to
inter-institutional litigation before the Court of Justice.4 Whereas the dual
1. See e.g. Van Elsuwege, “EU external action after the collapse of the pillar structure: In
search of a new balance between delimitation and consistency”, 47 CML Rev. (2010),
987–1019; Govaere, “Multi-faceted single legal personality and a hidden horizontal pillar: EU
external relations post-Lisbon” (2011) CYELS, 87–111; Wouters and Ramopoulos, “Revisiting
the Lisbon Treaty’s constitutional design of EU external relations” in Rossi and Casolari (Eds.),
The EU after Lisbon: Amending or Coping with the Existing Treaties? (Springer, 2014), pp.
215–237.
2. This special position is reflected in Arts. 24 and 40 TEU.
3. Art. 218(3) TFEU.
4. Van Elsuwege, “The Potential for Inter-Institutional Conflicts before the Court of Justice:
Impact of the Lisbon Treaty” in Cremona and Thies (Eds.), The European Court of Justice and
External Relations Law: Constitutional Challenges (Hart, 2014), pp. 123–24.
Common Market Law Review 52: 1379–1398, 2015.
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function of the High Representative, acting as Vice-President within the
Commission and head of the CFSP within the Council, decreases the
likelihood that the Commission will initiate court cases against the Council in
order to safeguard TFEU competences from CFSP influences,5 this role is
increasingly picked up by the European Parliament.6 The latter gained
significant external competences, except within the area of CFSP where its
powers remain fairly limited.7 It is, therefore, no surprise that the Parliament is
concerned about the exact scope of the CFSP and its relation to other external
policies. After a first dispute with the Council concerning the legal basis for
the adoption of restrictive measures against individuals or non-state entities,8
the Parliament now contested the procedure for the conclusion of an
international agreement in the field of CFSP.9 In particular, it sought the
Court’s clarification regarding the precise meaning of “exclusive CFSP
agreements”, whose conclusion is excluded from any parliamentary
intervention under Article 218(6) TFEU. In addition, the Parliament claimed
that its right to be “immediately and fully informed at all stages of the
procedure” as guaranteed under Article 218(10) TFEU applies to all
agreements concluded by the EU, including those falling within the CFSP.
2. Factual and legal background
At the end of 2008, the EU launched its Naval Force (EU NAVFOR)
Operation Atalanta to fight piracy off the coast of Somalia. The operation is
part of the Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) – prior to
the Treaty of Lisbon called European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) –
and builds upon a number of UN Security Council resolutions calling for
international action to repress acts of piracy and armed robbery in the
region.10 In this context, the EU concluded a number of agreements
5. Nevertheless, it is remarkable that the Commission intervened in Case C-658/11 on the
side of the European Parliament.
6. On the active role of the European Parliament, see Czuczai, “The respect for the principle
of ‘institutional balance’ and its developing inter-institutional practice after Lisbon with special
regard to the European Parliament” in Nagy Csongor (Ed.) Liber Amicorum Janos Martonyi
(HVG-ORAC, 2014), pp. 149–155.
7. Art. 36 TEU.
8. Case C-130/10, Parliament v. Council (smart sanctions), EU:C:2012:472.
9. Significantly, the European Parliament also contests the validity of the Council Decision
for the conclusion of the Pirate Transfer Agreement with Tanzania, Case C-263/14, Parliament
v. Council, action brought on 28 May 2014, pending.
10. See, for the broader context, Erkelens, “Institutional and Legal Aspects of the EU’s
Judicial Policy to Fighting Piracy Off the Coast of Somalia”, (2014) CLEER Working Papers
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concerning the transfer of suspects of piracy.11 According to the Parliament,
the Pirate Transfer Agreement with Mauritius12 did not relate exclusively to
the CFSP but is also linked to judicial cooperation in criminal matters, police
cooperation and development cooperation. To defend its prerogatives, the
Parliament addressed the ECJ with a request for the annulment of Council
Decision 2011/640 CFSP of 12 July 2011, which had been adopted on the
legal basis of Articles 37 TEU and 218(5) and (6) TFEU. In addition, the
Parliament argued that the Council had violated its duty of information during
the procedure, given that the text of the contested decision and of the
EU-MauritiusAgreement were sent more than three months after the adoption
of that decision and the signing of the agreement, and 17 days after their
publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.
Significantly, the European Parliament did not challenge the choice of the
substantive legal basis (Art. 37 TEU) for the adoption of Council Decision
2011/640 CFSP. This provision allows the Union to conclude international
agreements in the field of CFSP. Even though the Parliament claimed that the
EU-Mauritius Agreement also pursued aims related to other EU policies than
the CFSP, it accepted that those were only incidental to the main objective of
preserving international peace and security.13 Hence, the dispute entirely
focused on the procedural requirements for the conclusion of CFSP
agreements under Article 218 TFEU.
In essence, two contradictory views on the interpretation of Article 218(6)
TFEU were at stake. According to the Parliament, supported by the
Commission, this provision establishes a general rule that the conclusion of an
international agreement by the Council must be preceded by either the consent
or the consultation of the Parliament. Only in the exceptional situation that an
agreement is exclusively related to the CFSP, can the Council proceed without
any involvement of the Parliament. It was argued that the exception should be
interpreted narrowly and as soon as an agreement relates to any other policy of
the Union, the Parliament should have a formal role in the procedure for
concluding that agreement.14 To support its argument, the Parliament pointed
at the different formulation of Article 218(3) TFEU, which refers to
2014/4; Koutrakos and Skordas (Eds.), The Law and Practice of Piracy at Sea. European and
International Perspectives (Hart, 2014).
11. In 2009, the Council approved transfer agreements with Kenya and the Seychelles
through an Exchange of Letters (Council Decision 2009/263/CFSP, O.J. 2009, L 79/49 and
Council Decision 2009/877/CFSP, O.J. 2009, L 315/35). In 2011 and 2014, transfer agreements
were concluded with Mauritius and Tanzania (O.J. 2011, L 254/3 and O.J. 2014, L 108/3).
12. The official title is “Agreement between the EU and Mauritius on the conditions of
transfer of suspected pirates and associated seized property from the EU-led naval force to the
Republic of Mauritius and on the conditions of suspected pirates after transfer”.
13. Judgment, paras. 44–46.
14. Judgment, para 24.
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agreements relating “exclusively or principally” to the CFSP and Article
218(6) TFEU, which only mentions exclusive CFSP agreements. From this
distinction, it drew the conclusion that where agreements “relate only
principally” to the CFSP and include incidental measures relating also to other
policies, the Council cannot conclude them without first having involved the
Parliament.15 Contrary to this textual interpretation, the Council and all
intervening Member States claimed that the notion “exclusively” under
Article 218(6) TFEU must be understood in light of the substantive legal basis
of an agreement. In other words, when the decision for concluding an
agreement is solely based on a provision falling within the CFSP, there is no
procedural requirement to involve the Parliament. Any other interpretation
was deemed to upset the institutional balance laid down by the Treaties and as
guaranteed under Article 40 TEU.16 The latter provision ensures that the
application of the Union’s competences and procedures in the field of CFSP
do not affect other EU competences and procedures and vice versa.
With regard to the duty of information, expressed in Article 218(10) TFEU,
the Council contested the Court’s jurisdiction to rule on the legality of a CFSP
agreement in light of Article 24(1) TEU and Article 275 TFEU.17 Anyhow, it
maintained that there had been no violation of Article 218(10) TFEU. “Albeit
slightly longer than usual,” the time needed to inform the Parliament was
considered to be “still reasonable, taking into account also the fact that this
period included the summer break.”18 The Parliament, on the other hand,
found the delay unacceptable and argued that the Court’s jurisdiction is only
excluded with respect to specific provisions on the CFSP in Chapter 2 of Title
V of the EU Treaty but not in relation to Article 218(10) TFEU.19
3. Opinion ofAdvocate General Bot
For Advocate General Bot, the question about the applicable procedure for
the conclusion of an international agreement cannot be disconnected from the
preliminary question of the choice of the substantive legal basis for the
adoption of the agreement.20 Both aspects are inherently connected with each
15. Judgment, para 37.
16. Judgment, para 42.
17. Both Art. 24(1) TEU and Art. 275 TFEU state that the Court shall have no jurisdiction
with regard to the provisions of the CFSP, with the exception of its jurisdiction to monitor
compliance with the mutual non-affectation clause of Art. 40 TEU and to review the legality of
CFSP decisions providing for restrictive measures against natural or legal persons.
18. Judgment, para 67.
19. Judgment, para 68.
20. Opinion, para 19.
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other, given that the legal basis of a measure determines the procedures to be
followed in adopting that measure. The Parliament’s isolated and textual
interpretation of the procedural requirements of Article 218 TFEU can,
therefore, not be accepted. Moreover, the Parliament’s approach has
far-reaching practical consequences which would, in view of the Advocate
General, be “contrary to the wish of the authors of the treaties.”21 Taking into
account the duty of consistency between the EU’s various policies and the
existence of cross-cutting external relations objectives, an agreement
concluded in the field of the CFSP almost necessarily also relates to other
Union policies, at least indirectly. Hence, following the Parliament’s
suggestions would undermine the procedural specificities of the CFSP, which
involves, amongst others, limited possibilities for parliamentary intervention.
In this context, the Advocate General recalled that the Lisbon Treaty did not
aim to abolish or merge the different Union policies nor did it intend to nullify
their procedural particularities.22
The difference in wording between Article 218(3) and Article 218(6) TFEU
does not affect his conclusions, since the two provisions cover two distinct
stages of the procedure relating to international agreements.23 Moreover,
Article 218(6) TFEU is based upon a parallelism between the procedure for
adopting measures internally and externally. According to the Advocate
General, it would, therefore, be “contrary to the letter and the spirit of that
provision to confer on the Parliament greater powers for the adoption of a
decision concerning the signing and the conclusion of an international
agreement than it enjoys for the adoption of an internal measure which has no
such object.”24 This parallelism between the internal and external powers
reflects the institutional balance established by the Treaty of Lisbon, which
envisages “a limited role for the Parliament in defining and implementing the
CFSP, whether through unilateral measures or international agreements.”25
Proceeding from this contextual analysis of Article 218(6) TFEU, the
Advocate General turned to the question whether or not Article 37 TEU is the
appropriate – and sole – substantive legal basis of the contested decision. In
line with the established case law, this involved a traditional centre of gravity
test. For this purpose, the Advocate General not only referred to the aim and
content of the contested decision and the EU-Mauritius Pirate Transfer
Agreement but also to the broader context of the UN Security Council
21. Opinion, para 22.
22. Opinion, para 24.
23. Opinion, para 28.
24. Opinion, para 30.
25. Opinion, para 31.
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resolutions and Operation Atalanta.26 This led him to the conclusion that the
Agreement is part of a broader strategy against piracy and, in essence, an
implementing measure of Operation Atalanta as established under Joint
Action 2008/851/CFSP. This, in turn, “constitutes a strong indication that [the
agreement] is connected with the CFSP.27
The Pirate Transfer Agreement is regarded as an essential element for the
proper implementation and effectiveness of the military operation established
by the Joint Action. Even though transferring and prosecuting suspects of
piracy are not military activities, they are considered to be “intrinsically
linked” to Operation Atalanta.28 Both the Agreement and the Joint Action
are, therefore, considered to fall within the scope of the CFSP. Their aim is to
fight piracy off the coast of Somalia, which represents a threat to international
security and stability as recognized in the relevant UN Security Council
resolutions. The Advocate General specifically referred to Article 21(2)(a) to
(c) and (h) TEU in order to justify this conclusion.29 Even though those
provisions constitute horizontal objectives of the EU’s external action, they are
in view of the Advocate General “traditionally assigned to the CFSP”.30 Such
a reference to past practice is deemed necessary in order to deal with the
absence of specific CFSP objectives in the Treaties, on the one hand, while
facing a necessity to define the boundaries between the CFSP and the other
policies, on the other.31 The Advocate General found support for his
conclusion in the Smart sanctions case, where the Court also referred to UN
Security Council resolutions and references to the preservation of
international peace and security in order to link the objective of combating
international terrorism to the sphere of the CFSP.32
Building upon this broad, contextual conception of the CFSP, the Advocate
General concluded that Council Decision 2011/640 was correctly based on
Article 37 TEU. This provision allows for the conclusion of international
agreements in all areas of the CFSP, including in the field of the Common
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). For the Advocate General, it was crystal
clear that “as the necessary extension of the Atalanta military operation,
pursuing the same objective of preserving international peace and security, the
[Pirate Transfer] Agreement falls within the sphere of the CSDP” as defined
in Articles 42 and 43 TEU.33 The observation put forward by the Parliament
26. Opinion, paras. 42–69.
27. Opinion, para 70.
28. Opinion, paras. 72 and 78.
29. Opinion, para 84.
30. Opinion, para 85.
31. Opinion, paras. 85–86.
32. Case C-130/10, Parliament v. Council, para 76.
33. Opinion, para 93.
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and the Commission, that the transfer of suspects of piracy and all related
activities relate more to judicial cooperation in criminal matters as defined in
the Treaty provisions on the Area of Freedom Security and Justice (AFSJ) did
not affect his conclusion. In this respect, theAdvocate General pointed out that
CSDP missions can make use of civilian means to tackle threats to
international security stemming from criminal activities.34 Nevertheless, he
understood that the arguments put forward by the Parliament and the
Commission concern a more fundamental problem, which is the absence of a
clear delimitation between the CFSP and the AFSJ.
According to the Advocate General, a connection with the AFSJ is only
justified in situations where judicial and/or police cooperation developed
outside the Union is directly related to the internal security of the Union. On
the other hand, a link with the CFSP is in place when a Union action aims at
fostering the external security situation, i.e. in a region outside the Union.35
He admitted that this basic division is not always easy in practice. However,
taking into account that the Pirate Transfer Agreement with Mauritius forms
part of an international cooperation initiative launched by the Security
Council to combat security threats in the Indian Ocean, the balance is tilted in
favour of the CFSP in this particular case.36 In other words, the objectives and
context of a particular action rather than its specific nature are decisive for the
choice of the legal basis. As such, CSDP missions can make use of traditional
AFSJ instruments in order to serve the objectives of the CFSP.37
The Advocate General also set aside the argument that the Agreement
includes a development component which might justify a modification of the
CFSP legal basis. Despite the broad interpretation of development
cooperation in the case law of the Court,38 there are also limits to the scope of
application of Article 208 TFEU. In particular, “a distinction must be drawn
between measures which are aimed at development and measures which
pursue other objectives of the Union, such as CFSP objectives.”39 In the case
at stake, the assistance to Mauritius did not go beyond the objectives for which
the Atalanta operation was established, and therefore, a reference a
supplementary legal basis relating to development cooperation was not
deemed appropriate.
34. Opinion, paras. 97–105.
35. Opinion, para 112.
36. Opinion, paras. 114–115.
37. Opinion, para 118.
38. See Case -377/12, Commission v. Council (Philippines PCFA), EU:C:2014:1903. For
comments, see Broberg and Holdgaard, “Demarcating the Union’s Development Cooperation
Policy after Lisbon”, 51 CML Rev. (2014), 547–568.
39. Opinion, para 127.
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Finally, with regard to the Parliament’s second plea alleging a violation of
Article 218(10) TFEU, the Advocate General first confirmed the jurisdiction
of the Court to deal with this question. The procedural requirements laid down
in Article 218 TFEU do not constitute specific CFSP measures within the
meaning of the second subparagraph of Article 24(1) TEU and the first
paragraph of Article 275 TFEU. As a result, they do not escape the scrutiny of
the EU judicature even when agreements exclusively relating to the field of
CFSP are at stake.40 Nevertheless, the Advocate General believed that the
Court should take into account the specific characteristics of the CFSP. This
implies, for instance, that the Council may be expected to act more quickly and
to provide more detailed information when the Parliament is to give its
consent or to be consulted than when it is only to be informed of agreements
relating exclusively to the CFSP. Be that as it may, the Advocate General also
clearly stated that “the information obligation under Article 218(10) TFEU is
generally applicable, including in matters of the CFSP.”41 He did not see any
problem as far as the case at stake was concerned. The Council informed the
President of the Parliament about the opening of negotiations, of the adoption
of the contested decision and the signing of the Agreement. As the Parliament
was not required to give its opinion on the content of the Agreement, there
was no need to provide information about the progress of the negotiations.
Also the late communication of the contested decision and the Agreement was
not found to be problematic. Even though “it would have been more in keeping
with the spirit of Article 218(10) TFEU” if the Parliament had been informed
before their publication in the Official Journal, “the period in question neither
infringed the Parliament’s prerogatives nor could it influence the content of the
Agreement”.42 For this reason, he proposed that the Court dismiss the
Parliament’s application entirely.
4. Judgment of the Court of Justice
After repeating its classic rules on the choice of legal basis, the Court
emphasized that the Parliament did not contest the use of Article 37 TEU as
the sole substantive legal basis for the adoption of the contested decision.43 It
subsequently rejected a textual interpretation of Article 218(6) TFEU to
define whether or not the Parliament should be involved in the procedure for
concluding the Pirate Transfer Agreement with Mauritius. Rather, the Court
40. Opinion, paras. 136–138.
41. Opinion, para 114.
42. Opinion, para 157.
43. Judgment, paras. 43–45.
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extensively analysed not only the wording but also the objectives and context
of Article 218 TFEU.
As regards the objectives, Article 218 TFEU was introduced with the
Treaty of Lisbon in order to establish “a single procedure of general
application concerning the negotiation and conclusion of international
agreements which the European Union is competent to conclude in the fields
of its activity, including the CFSP, except where the Treaties lay down special
procedures.”44 However, the procedural rules defined in Article 218 TFEU
must take into account the specific powers of the institutions under the
respective EU policies. For this reason, Article 218(6) TFEU distinguishes
between three different situations as far as the involvement of the Parliament
is concerned for the conclusion of an international agreement (consent,
consultation and information). This division reflects the internal
decision-making procedures. The Parliament’s consent is required for the
conclusion of agreements covering areas which internally require the ordinary
legislative procedure or the special legislative procedure where the consent of
the Parliament is needed. Following the same logic, the Parliament is
precluded from participation in the conclusion of agreements exclusively
relating to the CFSP and needs to be consulted in all other occasions. Hence,
in line with the Opinion of the Advocate General, the ECJ interpreted the
meaning of Article 218(6) TFEU in light of the institutional balance as
provided under the Treaties.45
The identified symmetry between the internal and external
decision-making procedures implies that the substantive legal basis of the
Council decision concluding an international agreement determines the type
of procedure applicable under Article 218(6) TFEU. In other words, when an
agreement is legitimately founded on a sole legal basis pertaining to the field
of CFSP, the agreement can be concluded without the Parliament’s consent or
opinion. In contrast to the Advocate General, the ECJ did not enter into the
discussion whether the sole use of Article 37 TEU was indeed appropriate for
the adoption of Council Decision 2011/640/CFSP concluding the Pirate
Transfer Agreement with Mauritius. The Parliament’s explicit acceptance of
Article 37 TEU allowed the Court to confine itself to the procedural aspects of
the case. As a result, the judgment carefully avoids any references to the
delimitation between CFSP and TFEU competences and simply concludes
that the first plea of the Parliament is unfounded.
With regard to its second plea in law, alleging the infringement of Article
218(10) TFEU, the Parliament was more successful. After confirming its
44. Judgment, para 52.
45. Judgment, para 56.
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jurisdiction to deal with this question,46 the ECJ clarified the Parliament’s
right to be fully and immediately informed by the Council. This obligation
constitutes an essential procedural requirement because it allows the
Parliament “to exercise democratic scrutiny of the EU’s external action” and,
more specifically, to ensure that its powers are respected in the process leading
to the choice of legal basis for a decision concluding an international
agreement.47 In contravention to the Advocate General, who suggested that
the Court adopt a lenient approach, taking into account the limited role of the
Parliament in the field of CFSP, the ECJ stressed the fundamental importance
of the information requirement as “an expression of democratic principles on
which the European Union is founded”.48 As a result, the delayed
communication on behalf of the Council resulted in the annulment of the
contested Council decision. Upon request of both the Parliament and the
Council, and the majority of the intervening Member States, the Court
maintained the effects of the annulled decision until it is replaced. This was
deemed necessary to ensure the continuity of the operations carried out on the
basis of the EU-Mauritius Agreement and, in particular, “the full effectiveness
of the prosecutions and trials of suspected pirates arrested by EUNAVFOR”.49
5. Comments
The Court’s judgment clarifies the procedural aspects for the conclusion of
international agreements in the post-Lisbon EU legal order. In particular, it
sheds light on the role of the European Parliament with regard to agreements
pertaining to the sphere of the CFSP. With its explicit recognition of the
Parliament’s right to information under Article 218(10) TFEU, the ECJ
confirms that the CFSP is no longer to be regarded as a purely
intergovernmental construction escaping judicial and parliamentary control.
At the same time, the Court equally safeguards the institutional balance by
rejecting a textual interpretation of Article 218(6) TFEU. However, the
judgment did not tackle the most significant constitutional challenge, which is
the need for clear criteria to define the scope of the CFSP in relation to other
EU policies, in particular the external dimension of the AFSJ.
46. Judgment, paras. 69–74. The ECJ essentially pointed at the general application of Art.
218 TFEU and the need for a narrow interpretation of the exception that CFSP measures fall
outside the Court’s general jurisdiction as established under Art. 19 TEU.
47. Judgment, para 79.
48. Judgment, para 81.
49. Judgment, paras. 88–91.
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5.1. Limits to the insulation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy in
the EU legal order
Pursuant to Article 24(1) TEU, the CFSP is “subject to specific rules and
procedures”. This implies, amongst others, a dominant role for the European
Council and the Council, the absence of parliamentary involvement in the
decision-making process, and the exclusion of the Court’s jurisdiction with
regard to CFSP acts unless the borderline between CFSP and non-CFSP
competences and procedures is at stake or when judicial review of restrictive
measures against natural or legal persons is concerned. Nevertheless, the
CFSP is also an integral part of the EU legal order, which is based upon a
single legal personality since the abolition of the pillar structure with the
Treaty of Lisbon. As a result, the interpretation and application of CFSP
activities is subject to the constitutional norms of EU law.50
The Court’s judgment builds upon this new reality to draw significant
conclusions regarding the scope of its own jurisdiction, on the one hand, and
the role of the European Parliament in the field of CFSP, on the other. First,
Article 19 TEU confers on the ECJ a general competence to ensure that in the
interpretation and application of the Treaties the law is observed. The
exclusion of the Court’s jurisdiction with regard to CFSP measures constitutes
an exception to this rule, which has to be interpreted restrictively.51 This is a
direct result of the Lisbon Treaty, which reversed the order in the sense that
under the old rules the Court only had jurisdiction where it was explicitly
provided.52
Second, the recognition of the Court’s jurisdiction has more far-reaching
implications as far as the position of the CFSP in the EU legal order is
concerned. The abolition of the pillars and, as a consequence, the integration
of the CFSP in the unitary legal order of the Union implies that CFSP acts are
no longer to be regarded as distinct intergovernmental measures immune to
any judicial intervention. Rather, they are full-fledged sources of EU law be it
of a specific, non-legislative, nature the content of which cannot be
challenged before the Court. Nevertheless, as far as procedural questions are
concerned or when key constitutional issues such as the balance of power or
the rule of law are at stake, the ECJ has its role to play.53 This, for instance, also
implies that CFSP acts do not escape the duty to respect fundamental rights, in
50. Hillion, “A powerless court? The European Court of Justice and the Common Foreign
and Security Policy” in Cremona and Thies (Eds), The European Court of Justice and External
Relations Law: Constitutional Challenges (Hart Publishing, 2014), pp. 47–70.
51. Judgment, para 70.
52. Ex Art. 46 TEU.
53. Hillion, op. cit. supra note 50.
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accordance with Article 51(1) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.54
Even though the Court did not feel a need to reiterate this principle in its
judgment on the present case, Advocate General Bot correctly stated that the
CFSP “like the Union’s other policies, is subject to respect for fundamental
rights.”55
Third, according to the same logic, the European Parliament is not
completely side-lined from the field of application of the CFSP. Of course, the
level of democratic control to be exercised by the Parliament is strictly limited
as a result of the balance of powers laid down in the Treaties.56 Or, to use the
Court’s own words, it is “the result of the choice made by the framers of the
Lisbon Treaty” to confer a more limited role on the Parliament with regard to
the Union’s action under the CFSP in comparison to other policy areas.57 This,
however, does not mean that the CFSP is isolated from the Parliament’s
activities. There is only a lesser degree of parliamentary intervention, which
basically means a simple right to be informed about ongoing CFSP activities.
This is, with so many words, expressed in Article 36 TEU for the adoption of
CFSP measures and in Article 218(10) TFEU as far as the conclusion of
international agreements in the field of CFSP is concerned. In contrast to the
Advocate General, who minimized the significance of Article 218(10) TFEU
since the Parliament is not required to give its opinion on the content of the
Agreement, the Court stressed the importance of the Parliament’s right to
information “as an expression of the democratic principles on which the
European Union is founded.”58 Hence, just as with regard to the jurisdiction of
the ECJ, also the role of the European Parliament in relation to the area of
CFSP has strengthened as a result of the Lisbon Treaty and the abolition of the
pillars.
Arguably, the so-called “PESCalization” of the EU’s external relations,
pointing at the increasing importance of the CFSP in policies such as
counterterrorism,59 is partly balanced as a result of a certain
“parliamentarization” of the CFSP. As pointed out by the Court, observing
54. Case C-130/10, Parliament v. Council, para 83.
55. Opinion, para 119.
56. In Case C-409/13 (Council v. Commission, EU:C:2015:217, para 96), the ECJ
confirmed that the principle of democracy cannot be disconnected from the division of powers.
This was expressed even more explicitly in the Opinion of A.G. Jääskinen in the same case,
when he observed that “adopting from the outset a principle of preference for maximising the
Parliament’s participation in the decision-making process is tantamount to altering the
institutional balance laid down by the Treaties” (para 52).
57. Case C-130/10, Parliament v. Council, para 82.
58. Judgment, para 81.
59. Hillion, “Fighting terrorism through the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy”, in
Govaere and Poli (Eds.), Management of Global Emergencies, Threats and Crises by the
European Union (Brill, 2014), p. 82.
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the Parliament’s right to information is crucial to guarantee the democratic
scrutiny of the Council’s activities in this field and to ensure that the correct
procedures are followed.60 In this respect, it is noteworthy that the Treaty of
Lisbon has reinforced the Parliament’s role in relation to the CFSP.61 Article
36 TEU uses mandatory language to describe the High Representative’s
obligation to regularly consult the European Parliament about the basic policy
choices and the evolution of the CFSP and CSDP. Moreover, she “shall ensure
that the views of the European Parliament are duly taken into consideration.”62
Even though the latter commitment is difficult to verify, it illustrates that the
drafters of the Lisbon Treaty intended to enhance the democratic legitimacy
of the CFSP. For this purpose, the European Parliament is also given a right to
ask questions and to make recommendations on CFSP-related matters,
whereas “twice a year it shall hold a debate on implementing” the CFSP.63 In
light of the identified symmetry between the internal rules on the adoption of
EU measures and the procedure for the conclusion of international
agreements (see below), the Court’s explicit recognition of the Parliament’s
right to be informed about exclusive CFSP agreements thus makes sense. Of
course, the question remains how far such a right to information can stretch
taking into account the often sensitive political nature of CFSP agreements.
The case law on access to documents at least indicates that the secrecy of
international negotiations cannot be used as a general excuse to refuse
information to the public. Constitutional principles such as transparency and
proportionality apply in this respect, whether or not the Council is acting in the
field of CFSP.64 By analogy, the duty to inform the Parliament under Article
218(10) TFEU, as a reflection of the more general duty of sincere cooperation
among the institutions set out in Article 13 TEU, is to be interpreted in light of
those principles.
60. Judgment, para 86.
61. Czuczai, “The Development of a Single Counter-terrorism Policy in the ExternalAction
of the EU: The Role of The Council – Some Legal Aspects after Lisbon” in Herlin-Karnell and
Matera (Eds.), External Dimension of the EU Counter-Terrorism Policy, (2014) CLEER
Working Papers 2014/2, pp. 54–58.
62. Art. 36 (1) TEU.
63. Art. 36 (2) TEU.
64. Case T-14/98, Hautala v. Council, EU:T:1999:157; Case C-353/99 P, Council v.
Hautala, EU:C:2001:661; Case T-301/10, In’t Veld v. Commission, EU:T:2013:135; Case
T-331/11, Besselink v. Council, EU:T:2013:419, para 87. See also: Hillion, op. cit. supra note
50, p. 66. On the discretionary power of the EU institutions concerning access to documents,
see further Case C-576/12 P, Jurasinovic v. Council, EU:C:2013:777 and C-399/12P, Stichting
Corporate Europe Observatory v. Commission, EU:C:2015:360.
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5.2. A holistic approach to the choice of legal basis for the conclusion of
international agreements
Whereas the ECJ confirmed the Parliament’s right of scrutiny in respect to the
CFSP, it rejected the suggested textual interpretation regarding the procedural
rules for the conclusion of international agreements under Article 218(6)
TFEU. As pointed out by Advocate General Sharpston in another context,
“Article 218 TFEU is based on a particular interinstitutional balance between
the Commission, the Council and the Parliament”.65 The interpretation
proposed by the Parliament would significantly affect this balance. As
Advocate General Bot correctly observed, it is nearly impossible to envisage
an international agreement in the field of CFSP that does not, in one way or
another, affect other EU policy areas.66 As a result, the Parliament’s
interpretation would de facto exclude the possibility of exclusive CFSP
agreements, which is difficult to reconcile with Article 40(2) TEU, or, it
would lead to situations where the Council opposes the integration of other
policy aspects into the CFSP measures it adopts, which contradicts the
purpose of consistency as expressed in Article 21(3) TEU.
Moreover, the suggested disconnection between the substantive legal basis
of a Council decision and the procedural requirements under Article 218(6)
TFEU would lead to very complex situations. It would then, for instance, be
possible that two agreements with a substantive CFSP legal basis nevertheless
need to follow different procedural rules depending on a second “exclusivity
test”. Such an approach would indeed create (additional) legal uncertainty
since the borderline between situations where an agreement predominantly or
exclusively pursues CFSP objectives is particularly difficult to define.
Instead, the Court’s contextual interpretation of Article 218(6) TFEU in light
of general constitutional principles such as the institutional balance and the
requirement of consistency is much more convincing.
Of course, this holistic approach to the choice of legal basis does not solve
the key constitutional challenge, which is the need for “clear criteria to define
the scope of the CFSP in relation to other fields of the Union’s external
action”.67 The Court managed to circumvent this tricky issue due to the
Parliament’s acceptance of Article 37 TEU as the substantive legal basis for
the agreement. As a result, the judgment does not teach us much about the
65. Opinion of AG Sharpston in Joined Cases C-103 & 165/12, Parliament and
Commission v. Council (Bilateral agreement authorizing utilization of the surplus of allowable
catch), EU:C:2014:2400, para 116.
66. Opinion, paras. 22–23.
67. Opinion, para 5. See, on this challenge, also Ott, “The legal basis for international
agreements Post-Lisbon. Of pirates and The Philippines”, (2014) MJ, 739–752; Engel,
“Delimiting competences in the EU: CFSP versus AFSJ Legal Bases”, (2015) EPL, 47–59.
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interpretation of Article 40 TEU or the role of Article 21 TEU. Nevertheless,
the Court reiterated the traditional “centre of gravity test” hinting that also in
the post-Lisbon context the aim and content of a measure are crucial to decide
on the choice of legal basis.68 In line with the earlier Smart sanctions case, this
implies that the Court does not consider possible alternative criteria such as
the principle of lex specialis derogat lex generalis or a distinction on the basis
of the legislative nature of the respective measures.69 The horizontal
application of the centre of gravity test may therefore be regarded as another
implication of the EU’s unified legal order.
The question arises whether the outcome of this test may lead to a
combination of CFSP and TFEU legal bases. Whereas this option was ruled
out for the adoption of unilateral measures in the Smart sanctions case,70 no
procedural incompatibilities exist as far as international agreements are
concerned.71 This is a direct consequence of the single procedural code of
Article 218 TFEU and its direct link with the substantive legal basis of the
Council decision for concluding the agreement. In other words, when an
agreement equally concerns CFSP and TFEU competences, the interpretation
of Articles 218(6) and (8) TFEU implies that the consent of the European
Parliament can perfectly be combined with a unanimous decision in the
Council. Such a particular form of CFSP-TFEU mixity is already applied in
practice, for instance, with regard to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in
Southeast Asia.72
5.3. The delimitation between the external and internal security policies
of the Union: In search of clear criteria
Although the centre of gravity test seems clear and logical, its application to
concrete situations is far from evident. This is particularly the case when the
delimitation between CFSP and non-CFSP policies is at stake. First, Article
24(1) TEU does not provide for specific CFSP objectives but rather bluntly
defines the EU’s CFSP competence as covering “all areas of foreign policy
and questions relating to the Union’s security”. Second, Article 21 TEU
68. Judgment, para 43.
69. Such alternative solutions have been suggested in literature. See, e.g. Cremona,
“Defining competence in EU external relations: Lessons from the Treaty Reform Process” in
Dashwood and Maresceau (Eds.), Law and Practice of EU External Relations (CUP, 2008), p.
64.
70. Case C-130/10, Parliament v. Council, para 46.
71. Adam, “The Legal Basis of International Agreements of the European Union in the
Post-Lisbon Era” in Govaere, Lannon, Van Elsuwege, Adam (Eds.), The European Union in the
World. Essays in Honour of Marc Maresceau (Brill, 2014), p. 82.
72. Council Decision 2012/308/CFSP of 26 April 2012 on the accession of the European
Union to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, O.J. 2012, L 154.
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includes a comprehensive list of objectives for the entire range of EU external
action, implying a closer integration of the EU’s external policies. Third, the
old delimitation rule that priority should be given to the non-CFSP legal basis
whenever possible no longer applies.73 Fourth, despite the legal obligation to
respect the procedural requirements and institutional powers under the CFSP
and TFEU policies – as reflected in the “mutual non-affectation clause” of
Article 40 TEU – the reality on the ground implies that any attempt to make
such a neat distinction is almost by definition an artificial endeavour. This is
also reflected in EU policy documents stressing the indivisibility of security
threats and the necessity of increased coherence in response to crisis
situations.74
The solution offered by Advocate General Bot to apply a pre-Lisbon
understanding of CFSP objectives is not without criticism.75 This approach is
difficult to reconcile with the horizontal application of Article 21 TEU and
with the aim of the Lisbon Treaty to ensure more coherence in the EU’s
external action. It seems, therefore, no coincidence that the Court did not
make such a connection in the Smart sanctions case. There, the Court simply
observed that the preservation of peace, the prevention of conflicts and the
strengthening of international security – objectives mentioned under Article
21(2)(c) TEU – form “part of Chapter 1 laying down general provisions on the
Union’s external action in Title V of the EU.”76 As a result, those objectives
are not exclusively related to the CFSP but may well be addressed by other
Union policies as well.
The logic of Article 21 TEU and the generic definition of the CFSP under
Article 24(1) TEU thus implies that the balancing of largely overlapping
objectives is inherently problematic. For this reason, additional elements must
be taken into account to decide on the correct legal basis. It appears that at least
three elements are important in this respect. First, reference can be made to the
more specific policy objectives of the Common Security and Defence Policy
73. Ex Art. 47 TEU as interpreted in Case C-91/05, Commission v. Council,
EU:C:2008:288, paras. 58–62. For comments see e.g. Van Elsuwege, “On the boundaries
between the European Union’s First Pillar and Second Pillar: A comment on the ECOWAS
judgment of the European Court of Justice” (2008) CJEL, 531–548.
74. See O.J. 2010, C 115, “The Stockholm Programme. An Open and Secure Europe
Serving and Protecting Citizens”, and JOIN (2013), “The EU’s Comprehensive Approach to
External Conflicts and Crises”, 30 final.
75. Opinion, para 87, see also his Opinion in Case C-130/10,Parliament v.Council, para 63.
In his Opinion on the Mauritius Pirate Transfer Agreement, the A.G. also included the
objectives set out in Art. 21(2) (h) TEU as belonging to “those that are traditionally assigned to
the CFSP”. This is remarkable since those objectives, involving the promotion of “an
international system based on stronger multilateral cooperation and good governance” were not
included in ex Art. 11 TEU.
76. Case C-130/10, Parliament v. Council, para 62.
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(CSDP), laid down in Articles 42 and 43 TEU. This is what the Court did in
the Smart sanctions case77 and what Advocate General Bot proposed with
regard to the Pirate Transfer Agreement with Mauritius.78 Second, the
existence of a link with a United Nations Security Council Resolution is
another relevant factor that may be derived from the Smart sanctions case.
This means that the UN mandated international actions of the Union
presumably fall within the scope of the CFSP.79 Hence, not only the “aim and
content” of the contested EU measure is taken into account, but also the
broader context, in particular the link with UN Security Council Resolutions
and the objectives of the latter. Third, for international agreements, the
connection with other unilateral EU measures is relevant. Advocate General
Bot, for instance, argued that the Pirate Transfer Agreement with Mauritius
cannot be disconnected from the CFSP JointAction that established Operation
Atlanta.80
This preoccupation with the broader context and objectives is remarkable in
light of the Court’s pre-Lisbon case law. In its ECOWAS judgment, the Court
stressed that a Council Decision implementing a CFSP Joint Action does not
necessarily fall within the CFSP.81 It also completely ignored the existence of
United Nations Security Council Resolutions inviting the international
community to reduce the spread of small arms and light weapons in West
Africa.82 Of course, the post-Lisbon constitutional setting is fundamentally
different, but this does not absolve the EU institutions from respecting the
principle of conferral as expressed in the specific legal bases mentioned in the
Treaties.83 Hence, it appears a bridge too far to suggest that an international
agreement concluded in the framework of a CFSP action by definition
exclusively belongs to the field of CFSP.
Whereas such a contextual approach to the choice of legal basis helps to
solve the identified delimitation dilemmas, it implies that the content of an
international agreement (in this case dealing with criminal procedure and
mutual legal assistance) and the nature of the activities pursued (in this case
77. Case C-130/10, Parliament v. Council, para 64.
78. Opinion, paras. 94–98.
79. Opinion, para 114.
80. Opinion, paras. 70–71.
81. Case C-91/05, Commission v. Council, paras. 86–88.
82. The Swedish Government referred to the existence of such United Nations Security
Council Resolutions to claim that the contested EU decision fell within the EU’s CFSP
competence. See Case C-91/05, Commission v. Council, para 51.
83. This can be derived from Art. 3(6) TEU, which states that “The Union shall pursue its
objectives by appropriate means commensurate the competences which are conferred upon it in
the Treaties”. See also: Dashwood, “Conflicts of Competence in Responding to Global
Emergencies”, in Antoniadis, Schütze and Spaventa (Eds.), The European Union and Global
Emergencies. A Law and Policy Analysis (Hart, 2011), p. 35.
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the judicial treatment of persons) is largely ignored.84 As a result, the scope of
the CFSP is stretched to its outer limits involving a wide range of military and
civilian activities contributing to the objectives of international peace and
security. In the Advocate General’s view, this is a logical consequence of the
increased synergies between the EU’s different policies in the sense that “the
traditional instruments of the AFSJ can be mobilized to serve the objectives
of the CFSP.” Accordingly, “the external dimension of the AFSJ is thus
absorbed by the exercise of the Union’s foreign policy competence.” 85
Whereas the first part of this reasoning is in line with the EU’s
comprehensive approach to crisis situations, the conclusion that the
interaction between various instruments leads to an absorption of legal bases
is more controversial. Arguably, such an interpretation goes beyond the
requirement of consistency between the different EU policy areas.86 The latter
implies that policy instruments with a different legal basis in the Treaties can
be used to attain common objectives. From this perspective, the achievement
of international peace and security – as an external action objective laid down
in Article 21 TEU – may be pursued by both CFSP and TFEU instruments.
The Advocate General, on the other hand, starts from the presumption that all
actions contributing to the EU’s external security belong to the CFSP, whereas
the AFSJ is reserved for actions contributing to the internal security of the
Union.87 Such a basic division is difficult to uphold – not only because
the question of security is essentially indivisible, but also because it disregards
the specific nature of the different policy instruments involved. For instance,
the unfolding EU military operation in the Mediterranean Sea (EUNAVFOR
Med) clearly aims to address the issue of migration to the EU and as such it
contributes to the objectives of theAFSJ.88 Nevertheless, there is no doubt that
this operation belongs to the area of the CFSP, more specifically the CSDP, if
one looks at the specific nature and content of the activities pursued (such as
the interception and destruction of ships).This example illustrates the limits of
a mere objective-oriented approach.
It remains to be seen whether the Court will uphold the Advocate General’s
approach in the pending case on the Pirate Transfer Agreement with
Tanzania.89 In that case, the European Parliament explicitly challenges the
substantive legal basis of Council Decision 2014/198/CFSP, claiming that the
84. Matera and Wessel, “Context or Content? A CFSP or AFSJ Legal Basis for EU
International Agreements”, (2014) Revista de Derecho Comunitario Europeo, 1047.
85. Opinion, para 118.
86. Art. 21(3) TEU.
87. Opinion, para 112.
88. O.J. 2015, L 122/31, Council Decision (CFSP) 2015/778 of 18 May 2015 on a European
Union military operation in the Southern Central Mediterranean (EUNAVFOR MED).
89. Case C-263/14, Parliament v. Council, action brought on 28 May 2014, pending.
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agreement equally concerns the EU’s competence on judicial cooperation in
criminal matters (Art. 82 TFEU) and on police cooperation (Art. 87 TFEU).90
The latter presupposes a flexible interpretation of Article 67 TFEU. This
provision reveals that EU action in the field of AFSJ pursues a wide range of
objectives which are all in one way or another related to the internal security
of the European Union.91 Moreover, Articles 82 and 87 TFEU concern the
relationship between EU Member States and remain silent on cooperation
with third countries. Hence, a strict reading of the Treaty provisions may lead
to the conclusion that the Pirate Transfer Agreement goes beyond the Union’s
competence in the field of AFSJ. On the other hand, the view that the
agreement falls within the sphere of the CSDP, as argued by Advocate General
Bot, equally requires a flexible reading of the Treaty provisions. Articles 42
and 43(1) TEU indeed refer to the possible use of civilian means to support
third countries in combating terrorism in their territories, but the list of tasks
does not include issues such as the transfer of persons and property.92
6. Concluding remarks
The inter-institutional conflict on the procedure for the conclusion of the
EU-Mauritius Pirate Transfer Agreement illustrates quite well the
constitutional challenges of post-Lisbon EU external relations. In particular, it
reveals how the division between CFSP and non-CFSP external action
remains a major source of tension. Whereas the Court’s judgment
circumvented the crux of the matter, it helps to understand the
inter-institutional balance in the procedure for the conclusion of international
agreements.
The Court logically builds upon the unitary nature of the EU legal order to
underline the parallelism between the internal division of powers and the
procedural rules under Article 218(6) TFEU. This implies that the role of the
European Parliament with regard to CFSP agreements corresponds to its right
to be informed about CFSP initiatives under Article 36 TEU. In an attempt to
strike a balance between respect for the principle of conferral, on the one hand,
and the principle of democracy and legitimacy, on the other hand, the Court’s
90. Remarkably, the Parliament did not uphold its claim made in respect to the Mauritius
Agreement that there is also a link with the EU’s development cooperation policy.
91. Walker, “In Search of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: A Constitutional
Odyssey”, in Walker (Ed.), Europe’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (OUP, 2004), p. 7.
92. This argument was put forward by the European Parliament in the case. Without many
considerations, A.G. Bot responded that in his view “the list of CSDP tasks in Art. 43(1) TEU
is broad enough to cover all the provisions of the Agreement and, accordingly, to conclude that
that Agreement is an integral part of a CSDP task”. See Opinion, paras. 96–98.
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judgment confirms that the Parliament’s involvement in the field of CFSP is
more than a mere formality. Just as with regard to the circumscription of the
Court’s jurisdiction, the exclusion of the Parliament from the decision-making
process forms an exception to the general rule and must, therefore, be
interpreted restrictively.
The Court’s judgment also reiterates the classic “centre of gravity test”
without, however, applying this test to the facts of the case. The limits of this
approach to distinguish between CFSP and non-CFSP external action are well
known, even though the more specific objectives of the CSDP (Arts. 42 and 43
TEU) and contextual factors such as UN Security Council resolutions may
help to solve the conundrum. Nevertheless, this is not a panacea given the
unavoidable interference between various EU policies and objectives. This is
particularly the case with regard to the often blurred borderline between the
CFSP and the AFSJ. Hence, further guidance from the Court is needed to cope
with the legal uncertainty surrounding the post-Lisbon institutional balance in
the field of EU external relations.
Peter Van Elsuwege*
* Professor of EU law, Ghent European Law Institute (GELI), Ghent University.
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